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I. INTRODUCTION
Barack Obama’s 2008 presidential campaign promise of change
quickly materialized. Emblematic of this change, on January 29, 2009,
President Obama signed his first major piece of legislation, the Lilly
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act.1
The Act directly answers the employment-discrimination case Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.2 In a 5–4 decision authored by
Justice Samuel Alito, the Supreme Court held that employers cannot be
sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act over gender-based or racebased pay discrimination if the claims are based on decisions made by
the employer 180 days or more prior to filing.3 Relying in part on its
holding in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, the Supreme
Court held that a new statute of limitations was not triggered with each
individual paycheck a claimant receives after the initial limitations period has lapsed.4 Since Lilly Ledbetter did not file timely Equal Em† J.D. candidate, Seattle University School of Law, 2011; B.S., Political Science, Santa Clara University, 2008. The author would like to thank her family and friends for their support, interest, and
patience throughout this process. She also thanks her colleagues at the Seattle University Law Review for their comments, hard work, and good cheer.
1. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
2. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 636 (quoting Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002)) (“The
existence of past acts and the employee’s prior knowledge of their occurrence . . . does not bar employees from filing charges about related discrete acts so long as the acts are independently discriminatory and charges addressing those acts are themselves timely filed.”) (emphasis added). Equitable doctrines may limit or toll the time period in which employees must file the charge, and courts
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ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charges regarding her employer’s discriminatory pay decisions in the past,5 Ledbetter’s claim was
not cognizable.6
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act requires a plaintiff to file a discrimination charge against an employer within 180 days7 “after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.”8 The Lilly Ledbetter
Fair Pay Act addresses the particular application of Title VII’s chargefiling requirement.9 Stating that “unlawful employment practice occurs,
with respect to discrimination in compensation . . . each time wages,
benefits, or other compensation is paid, resulting in whole or in part from
such a [discriminatory] decision,” the Act’s charge-filing period begins
anew regardless of when the employee’s compensation was initially set
at a discriminatory rate.10 Consequently, virtually every time individuals
realize their employer’s decision to pay them less, the charge-filing period begins to run.11
The Act repudiates what Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg referred to as
a “cramped” majority reading of Title VII’s charge-filing requirement in
Ledbetter.12 In doing so, the Act accounts for the problem Ledbetter encountered when bringing her claim—that potential plaintiffs often will

may consider the entire scope of the hostile work environment claim so long as the act took place
during the statutory period.
5. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 2000e-5(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2000):
(1) A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the
alleged unlawful employment practice occurred and notice of the charge (including the
date, place and circumstances of the alleged unlawful employment practice) shall be
served upon the person against whom such charge is made within ten days thereafter, except that in a case of an unlawful employment practice with respect to which the person
aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority
to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect
thereto upon receiving notice thereof, such charge shall be filed by or on behalf of the
person aggrieved within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, or within thirty days after receiving notice that the State or local agency has
terminated the proceedings under the State or local law, whichever is earlier, and a copy
of such charge shall be filed by the Commission with the State or local agency. (emphasis
added).
6. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 637.
7. Some states, such as Ohio, allow 300 days. See Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub.
L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42
U.S.C.).
8. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (codified at 42
U.S.C.§ 2000e-5(e)(1)).
9. Id. (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
10. Id. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)(A)).
11. Sameena Mohammed, President Obama Keeps Campaign Promise in Signing Fair Pay
Act, Drawing Praise and Criticism, 14 PUB. INT. L. REP. 147, 148 (2009).
12. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 661 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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not discover that their employers are paying them less than other employees until years later.13 Supporters of the bill, including the EEOC’s
Acting Chairman, Stuart Ishimaru, noted that “the [A]ct is a victory
for . . . all workers across the country who are shortchanged by receiving
unequal pay for performing equal work.”14
While many praise the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act as “restoring
the status quo,” others criticize the Act for potentially exposing employers to a great deal of legal liability.15 Some commentators deem the Act
a “trial lawyer giveaway,” an “economic stimulus” for trial attorneys.16
In addition, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce expressed concern about the
increase in litigation that could result from the Act.17
But such criticisms are misguided. The Act does not change the requirements of a valid Title VII claim beyond the terms of the claim-filing
period.18 Plaintiffs must still overcome the difficulties inherent in obtaining the proof necessary to make a sufficient discrimination claim under
Title VII.19 In practice, since plaintiffs still carry the burden of proving a
discrimination claim, the Act will not alter the landscape of employmentdiscrimination litigation even if more claims arise as a result of the
amendments to Title VII.
The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act has many possible implications.
The central claim of this Comment is that, while the congressional action
passing the Act was correct, the terms of the Act must be narrowly construed to avoid further restrictive legislative action on Title VII claims.20
In other words, this Comment recommends that the Lilly Ledbetter Fair
13. Mohammed, supra note 11.
14. Id. (quoting Supporters Cheer, Critics Brace for Litigation as Obama Signs Ledbetter
Measure into Law, Bureau of National Affairs, 18 DAILY LAB. REP., Jan. 30, 2009, at A-1) [hereinafter Supporters Cheer].
15. Mohammed, supra note 11, at 149.
16. Congressional Documents, Democrats Lock Down House Floor, Send Trial Lawyer Giveaway to President Without Serious Debate, Jan. 27, 2009, 2009 WLNR 1630289; Derrick Cain,
Ledbetter, Paycheck Fairness Measures Win House Approval, 60 HUMAN RES. REP. (BNA), Jan. 13,
2009, at 2.
17. Mohammed, supra note 11, at 149 (citing Supporters Cheer, supra note 14).
18. The Act amends Title VII by adding:
[A]n unlawful employment practice occurs, with respect to discrimination in compensation in violation of this subchapter, when a discriminatory compensation decision or other
practice is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, or when an individual is affected by application of a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, including each time wages, benefits,
or other compensation is paid, resulting in whole or in part from such a decision or other
practice.
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 3, 123 Stat. 5, 5–6 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)(A)).
19. Id.
20. Id. (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
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Pay Act should be restricted to current payment schemes to prevent a
flood of claims unwarranted by Congress’s narrow amendment to Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act.
This Comment argues the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act’s consequences will be minimally felt, so long as the Act is narrowly construed.
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part II suggests congressional
action was appropriate after the Supreme Court’s Ledbetter decision and
discusses the political and legislative debate leading to the Act. Part III
analyzes the Act in application, exploring its meaning, implications, and
function. Part IV argues that the concerns and consequences arising
from the enactment of the Act can be alleviated and avoided by a narrow
interpretation of its amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Finally, Part V recommends a narrow interpretation of the Act that will
ensure that employment-litigation rates will not drastically increase, will
solve the problems posed by current paycheck schemes, and will finally
realize fair pay for all Americans.
II. LEDBETTER V. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO. AND THE AFTERMATH
The signing of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act embodies a climactic moment in an ongoing struggle between Congress and the courts to
define the meanings of the civil rights statutes in a variety of contexts.21
Despite the fact that the core issue of the Ledbetter case turned on a statute of limitations technicality, the case, nonetheless, captured the nation’s attention.22 Lilly Ledbetter’s compelling personal story garnered
an outcry of support and effectuated federal legislation.
This Part profiles the events leading up to enactment of the Act.
First, I explore Lilly Ledbetter’s personal experience during her employment at Goodyear. Second, I follow the progression of Ledbetter’s
federal court claim, ultimately ending at the Supreme Court’s decision.
Third, I discuss the political aftermath of the Supreme Court’s decision
in Ledbetter and examine the Act as it was signed into law. Finally, I
analyze the employment-litigation landscape immediately prior to the
Act’s implementation to set the context in which the Act went into effect.

21. Id.
22. See generally Steven Greenhouse, Experts Say Decision on Pay Reorders Legal Landscape, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/30/us/30pay.html?scp=33&sq=
lilly%20ledbetter&st=cse; Linda Greenhouse, Justices’ Ruling Limits Lawsuits on Pay Disparity,
N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2007, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9505E4D81430F933A0
5756C0A9619C8B63&&scp=83&sq=lilly%20ledbetter&st=cse.
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A. Lilly Ledbetter
In 1979, Lilly Ledbetter began working as an overnight supervisor23
at the Goodyear tire production plant in Gadsden, Alabama.24 Ledbetter
worked at Goodyear for the next nineteen years.25 During the course of
Ledbetter’s employment at Goodyear, approximately eighty people held
the same position, but only a handful were women.26 Ledbetter found
that it was difficult to fit in amongst her predominantly male colleagues.27 Eventually, Ledbetter complained to the company about how
she was treated by her male supervisors.28 In addition, she filed a complaint with the EEOC.29 Though her supervisor was reassigned, Ledbetter experienced continued feelings of isolation and patterns of discrimination,30 as some co-workers refused to talk to her, and she was excluded
from important management meetings.31
For years, Ledbetter was paid less than male employees working at
the same level.32 In 1997, Ledbetter was the only female manager at the
plant but was earning less than the lowest-paid male employee in the department. 33 At the time Ledbetter started working at Goodyear in 1979,
all the managers were paid the same amount regardless of gender, so
Ledbetter knew she was earning the same amount as the male manag23. Kate Pickert, 2-Minute Bio: Lilly Ledbetter, TIME, Jan. 29, 2009,
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1874954,00.html.
24. Justice Denied? The Implications of the Supreme Court’s Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire Employment Discrimination Decision: Hearing Before the Committee on Education and Labor of the
United States House of Representatives on Amendment of Title VII, 110th Cong. 10 (2007) (statement of Lilly Ledbetter) [hereinafter Testimony].
25. Id. at 11.
26. Id.
27. Ledbetter described her experience with male colleagues at Goodyear:
The plant manager flat out said that women shouldn’t be working in a tire factory because women just made trouble. One of my supervisors asked me to go down to a local
hotel with him and promised if I did, I would get good evaluations. He said if I didn’t, I
would get put at the bottom of the list. I didn’t say anything at first because I wanted to
try to work it out and fit in without making waves.
Id.
28. Ledbetter testified before Congress that she suffered sexual harassment and day-to-day
discrimination. Pickert, supra note 23.
29. According to Ledbetter:
The manager I complained to refused to do anything to protect me and instead told me I
was just being a troublemaker. So I complained to the EEOC . . . but after that, the company treated me badly. They tried to isolate me. People refused to talk to me . . . . So I got
a taste of what happens when you try to complain about discrimination.
Testimony, supra note 24, at 11.
30. Pickert, supra note 23.
31. Testimony, supra note 24, at 11.
32. Id. at 11–12.
33. Linda Greenhouse, Court Explores Complexities in Job Discrimination Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 28, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/28/washington/28scotus.html?fta=y.
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ers.34 But things changed when Goodyear switched to a new performance-based pay system.35 The new pay system meant that people doing
the same jobs could get paid differently, and the company kept all compensation information confidential.36
Over the course of the next several years, Ledbetter’s pay rate
changed.37 After some time, Ledbetter suspected she was not earning as
much as male employees.38 Hearing rumors that some men were being
paid as much as $20,000 a year for overtime work, Ledbetter volunteered
for the same amount of overtime as those men.39 When Ledbetter did not
receive anything near that $20,000 range in overtime pay, she “figured
their salaries must be higher than [hers], but [she] didn’t have any
proof—just rumors.”40
Eventually, Ledbetter obtained the proof she needed. One of Ledbetter’s managers “told [Ledbetter] that [she] was in fact, getting paid
less than the mandatory minimum salary put out in the Goodyear
rules.”41 Viewed annually, Ledbetter earned anywhere from 15–40%
less than her male counterparts, and “this pay gap, which resulted from
receiving smaller raises than the men, ‘added and multiplied’ over the
years.”42 According to Ledbetter, conclusive evidence of the pay disparities between Ledbetter and her male counterparts arrived “when someone
anonymously left a piece of paper in [her] mailbox at work, showing
what [she] got paid and what three other male managers were getting
paid.”43

34. Testimony, supra note 24, at 11.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Ledbetter stated:
Over the following years, sometimes I got raises, sometimes I didn’t. Some of the raises
seemed pretty good, percentage-wise, but I didn’t know if they were as good as the raises
other people were getting . . . . I worked hard and did a good job. I got a “Top Performance Award” in 1996.
Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Testimony, supra note 24, at 11.
41. Ledbetter stated:
So I started asking my supervisors to raise my pay to get me up to Goodyear’s mandatory
minimum salary levels. And after that, I got some good raises percentage-wise, but it
turned out that even then, those raises were smaller in dollar amounts than what Goodyear was giving to the men, even to the men who were not performing as well as I was.
Id. at 11–12.
42. Lani Guinier, Courting the People: Demosprudence and the Law/Politics Divide, 89 B.U.
L. REV. 539, 539 (2009) (citing Testimony, supra note 24, at 10).
43. Testimony, supra note 24, at 12.
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Shortly after receiving this information, Ledbetter filed another
complaint of discrimination with the EEOC in 1998.44 Ledbetter, now
nearly seventy years old, filed her EEOC complaint after she was transferred from her management job to a job requiring her to lift eightypound tires for an entire shift.45 From Ledbetter’s perspective, this was
retribution for filing her complaints.46 After the EEOC complaint was
filed, Ledbetter received another anonymous package47 showing again
what other male managers were being paid in comparison to her.48 Subsequently, Ledbetter filed a lawsuit against Goodyear and through discovery was finally able to get a complete picture of her pay compared to
her male colleagues.49 The lawsuit drew national attention to Ledbetter’s
story and inspired heated debates evaluating how employmentdiscrimination cases were handled by courts in the present, and how they
should be handled in the future.
B. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
Filing a claim in federal court, Ledbetter won a jury award of over
$3 million in back pay and compensatory damages.50 Specifically, the
jury found that Ledbetter had lost approximately $224,400 in salary over
time, and even more since her lower paychecks were used to calculate
her pension and social security benefits.51 The jury found it was “more
likely than not that [Goodyear] paid [Ledbetter] a[n] unequal salary because of her sex.”52 At trial, Goodyear admitted that Ledbetter was being
paid less than men doing the same work.53 But Goodyear claimed that
the difference arose because of Ledbetter’s poor performance.54 To rebut
Goodyear’s justification, other female managers testified and explained
that they were also discriminated against.55 One female manager, who
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Pickert, supra note 23.
47. Testimony, supra note 24, at 12.
48. According to the information Ledbetter received, she was making $3,727 per month, compared to men doing the very same job who were paid $4,286 to $5,236 per month. Pickert, supra
note 23.
49. Testimony, supra note 24, at 12.
50. Id.
51. Barriers to Justice: Examining Equal Pay for Equal Work: Hearing Before the Committee
on the Judiciary of the United State Senate, 110 Cong. (Sept. 23, 2008) (statement of Lilly Ledbetter).
52. Guinier, supra note 42, at 540 (quoting Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550
U.S. 618, 643 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
421 F.3d 1169, 1174 (11th Cir. 2005))).
53. Ledbetter, 421 F.3d 1169, 1173–74.
54. Id.; see also Testimony, supra note 24, at 11–12.
55. Id. at 12.
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was promoted from a secretary position, was only paid a secretary’s salary.56 The trial court judge agreed that the jury’s decision was supported
by ample evidence, but reduced the punitive and mental anguish award to
the $300,000 statutory cap under Title VII.57 Goodyear appealed the
verdict.58
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals heard the case and overturned the verdict in its entirety.59 The court of appeals held that Ledbetter failed to present a viable claim because she could not show intentional discrimination in the 180-day period before she complained to the
EEOC.60 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit-court
split61 on the statute of limitations issue for Title VII pay-discrimination
56. Testimony, supra note 24, at 12.
57. Id.; Ledbetter, 421 F.3d at 1176. Ledbetter’s $3 million jury award was capped at
$300,000 by a statute regulating punitive and compensatory damages in Title VII actions against
employers with 500 or more employees. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(D) (limiting compensatory
damages awarded under Title VII to $300,000 “in the case of a respondent who has more than 500
employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year . . . .”).
58. Ledbetter, 421 F.3d 1169.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1182–84. Because Goodyear had a periodic employee review system in place, the
court held:
We think, therefore, that at least in cases in which the employer has a system for periodically reviewing and re-establishing employee pay, an employee seeking to establish that
his or her pay level was unlawfully depressed may look no further into the past than the
last affirmative decision directly affecting the employee’s pay immediately preceding the
start of the limitations period.
Id. at 1182–84.
Thus, Ledbetter’s limitations period began at the last affirmative decision setting her pay rate and not
at each paycheck that followed.
61. Some circuit courts had taken the view that pay discrimination in every paycheck is just
part of one continuing discrimination violation. See, e.g., Brinkley-Obu v. Hughes Training, Inc., 36
F.3d 336, 348–49 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting that when the language of other pay-discrimination claims
are taken together “[p]aychecks are to be considered continuing violations of the law.”); Calloway v.
Partners Nat’l Health Plans, 986 F.2d 446, 449 (11th Cir. 1993) (“When the claim is one for discriminatory wages, the violation exists for every single day the employee works.” Further concluding,
“[R]ace based, discriminatory wage payments constitute a continuing violation of Title VII.”); Gibbs
v. Pierce County Law Enforcement Support Agency, 785 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The
policy of paying lower wages to female employees on each payday constitutes a ‘continuing violation.’”).
Yet, at the time Ledbetter was heard, other circuit courts had already adopted the “paycheck accrual rule” that Ledbetter argued for. The Supreme Court’s ruling in Bazemore v. Friday, a racialdiscrimination case, formed the foundation for the “paycheck accrual rule.” 478 U.S. 385, 395–96
(1986). Since the Court’s ruling in Bazemore, several circuit courts have adopted the rule. See, e.g.,
Wedow v. City of Kansas City, 442 F.3d 661, 671 (8th Cir. 2006) (using the Bazemore analysis,
which held that, “[e]ach week’s paycheck that delivers less on a discriminatory basis is a separate
Title VII violation.”); Forsyth v. Fed’n Employment & Guidance Serv., 409 F.3d 565, 573 (2d Cir.
2005) (noting that “a discriminatory pay schedule is a discrete act, even though it involves repeated
conduct,” and further holding that “[a]ny paycheck given within the statute of limitations period
therefore would be actionable, even if based on a discriminatory pay scale set up outside of the statutory period. But, a claimant could only recover damages related to those paychecks actually deli-
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claims.62 In a 5–4 decision authored by Justice Alito, the Supreme Court
held that Ledbetter’s claim was untimely because it relied on intentional
discriminatory pay decisions that occurred outside of the 180-day charging period under Title VII.63
In order for Ledbetter’s EEOC claim to be cognizable, two elements had to be met. First, a plaintiff must show an “unlawful employment practice.” Included among Title VII’s “unlawful employment practices” is compensation discrimination based on one of five protected
classes: race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.64 Second, a plaintiff
must show that the unlawful employment practice constitutes disparate
treatment or, alternatively, creates a disparate impact.65 A disparatetreatment claim requires a plaintiff to “provide sufficient evidence to
support an inference that the differential treatment resulting from an employment decision was rooted in discriminatory intent.”66 Disparate
treatment “is the most easily understood type of discrimination”67 and
arises when “the employer simply treats people less favorably than others
because of their race, color, religion, sex, . . . national origin,” or other
proscribed attribute.68
In contrast, an employer’s intent is irrelevant under the disparateimpact theory of employment discrimination.69 A disparate-impact claim
arises from “an unjustified exclusion caused by some hiring or other employment device that disproportionately disadvantages a group defined
by race, color, religion, sex, age or national origin.”70
Ledbetter made a disparate-treatment claim under Title VII,71 alleging an unlawful pay scheme applied with discriminatory intent.72 Under

vered during the statute of limitations period.” The specific holding in Forsyth would be abrogated
by the Court’s holding in Ledbetter.); Shea v. Rice, 409 F.3d 448, 452–53 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (using
the Bazemore holding, the court held “[e]ach week’s paycheck that delivers less to a black than to a
similarly situated white is a wrong actionable under Title VII, regardless of the fact that this pattern
was begun prior to the limitations period.”).
62. Katie Putnam, Note, On Lilly Ledbetter’s Liberty: Why Equal Pay for Equal Work Remains
an Elusive Reality, 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 685, 690 (2009).
63. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
64. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 2000e-2, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
65. Id.
66. Putnam, supra note 62.
67. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
68. For example, situations where an employer promotes or pays younger employees more than
older employees. See Shannon v. Pay ‘N Save, 709 P.2d 799, 803 (1985).
69. For example, situations where an employer refuses to hire women. See 16A Wash. Prac.
§ 24.4.
70. Id. (citing Shannon, 709 P.2d at 803).
71. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 618–19 (2007).
72. Putnam, supra note 62.
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the statute, Ledbetter’s claim had to be filed within a 180-day period.73
Ledbetter conceded that her paychecks were not issued during the single
180-day statute of limitations period.74 Thus, under the plain language of
the statute, the paychecks Ledbetter received after 180 days did not result
from intentional discrimination because the statute of limitations had
passed. Ledbetter argued, however, that the issuance of each paycheck
was still actionable because each paycheck was implemented by a prior
discriminatory decision made by Goodyear.75 As such, each paycheck
was tainted by Goodyear’s intentionally discriminatory pay decision.76
Ledbetter’s primary legal argument was based on the “paycheck accrual rule,” described in dicta by Justice William Brennan in Bazemore v.
Friday.77 Bazemore was a racial-discrimination case brought by individual plaintiffs against the North Carolina Agricultural Extension Service
based on unfair pay and job selection.78 Originally, the Service employees in Bazemore were segregated into “a white branch” and a “Negro branch,” the latter receiving less pay.79 In 1965, the two branches
were merged.80 When Title VII was extended to public employees in
1972, African-American employees brought a lawsuit against the Service, claiming that the pay disparities originating in the old dual pay
scale persisted.81
Both the district court and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the plaintiffs did not prove the necessary elements of a discrimination claim.82 The district court made the general proposition that the
Service had conducted itself in a nondiscriminatory manner since the
merging of the two branches and since it became subject to Title VII.83
The court of appeals went further, holding that the Service was under no
obligation to eliminate any salary disparity between white and AfricanAmerican employees that originated prior to 1972, when Title VII became applicable to the public employees of the Service.84 The court of
appeals also acknowledged, however, that after the merger of the Ser73. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 623 (citing 42 U.S.C. §2000(e)(1) (2000) (“A charge under this
section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment
practice occurred . . . .” (emphasis added)).
74. Id. at 619.
75. Id. at 618.
76. Putnam, supra note 62, at 691.
77. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 618; Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 395–96 (1986).
78. Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 385–88.
79. Id. at 390–91.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 391.
82. Id. at 385–88.
83. Id. at 393.
84. Id. at 394.
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vice’s two branches “[s]ome pre-existing salary disparities continued to
linger on,” that these disparities continued after Title VII became effective on the Service in 1972, and continued even after the lawsuit was
filed.85 Yet, the court of appeals held that the law does not require that a
pre-Civil Rights Act pay disparity that should have been eliminated over
time, but has not yet been, be affirmatively eliminated.86
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Service had a duty to
eradicate pay disparities based on race that existed before Title VII was
enacted.87 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, stated that “[e]ach
week’s paycheck that delivers less to a black than to a similarly situated
white is a wrong actionable under Title VII, regardless of the fact that
this pattern was begun prior to the effective date of Title VII.”88 Justice
Brennan’s statement forms the backbone of the “paycheck accrual rule.”
In Ledbetter, Justice Alito’s majority opinion distinguished Bazemore, which Ledbetter argued required the Court to treat her claim differently because it related to pay.89 Stating that the rule was only meant to
apply to cases where an employer institutes a pay system that discriminates on its face, Justice Alito rejected Ledbetter’s argument for the
“paycheck accrual rule.”90 Unlike the pay structure used by the Service
in Bazemore, Goodyear’s salary structure used during Ledbetter’s tenure
at the company was not a mere continuation of a pre-1965, pre-Title VII,
discriminatory pay structure.91 Thus, the Bazemore analysis did not apply to Ledbetter’s claim.92
To further distinguish the difference between a continued use of a
discriminatory base wage and a discrete discriminatory act with continu85. Id. (citing Bazemore v. Friday, 751 F.2d 662, 666 (4th Cir. 1984)).
86. Id. at 395.
87. Id. at 395–96.
88. Id.
89. The Supreme Court in Ledbetter described the holding of Bazemore as:
[W]hen an employer adopts a facially discriminatory pay structure that puts some employees on a lower scale because of race, the employer engages in intentional discrimination whenever it issues a check to one of these disfavored employees. An employer that
adopts and intentionally retains such a pay structure can surely be regarded as intending
to discriminate on the basis of race as long as the structure is used.
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 634 (2007).
90. Justice Alito states:
[A] new Title VII violation does not occur and a new charging period is not triggered
when an employer issues paychecks pursuant to a system that is “facially nondiscriminatory and neutrally applied.” The fact that precharging period discrimination adversely affects the calculation of a neutral factor (like seniority) that is used in determining future
pay does not mean that each new paycheck constitutes a new violation and restarts the
EEOC charging period.
Id. at 637 (internal citations omitted).
91. Id. at 635.
92. Id. at 635–36.
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ing adverse results from the intentional use of a discriminatory pay system, the majority opinion discussed National Railroad Passenger Corp.
v. Morgan.93 Morgan defined a discrete act of discrimination as an act
which, in itself, “constitutes a separate actionable ‘unlawful employment
practice’”94 and that is “temporally distinct.”95 The Morgan Court identified examples of such discrete acts as “termination, failure to promote,
denial of transfer, or refusal to hire.”96
Furthermore, the Morgan Court distinguished the fact that a hostile
work environment claim “‘cannot be said to occur on any particular day.’
In other words, the actionable wrong is the environment, not the individual acts that, taken together, create the environment.” 97 Thus, because
Ledbetter alleged a series of discrete discriminatory acts, each of which
was “independently identifiable and actionable,” under Morgan she was
required to file a timely EEOC charge for each act of discrimination.98
Since Ledbetter did not do so, Justice Alito rejected her argument.99
Ultimately, the Court held that Ledbetter lost her case because her
Equal Pay Act claim had been abandoned after a magistrate judge dismissed it.100 The Equal Pay Act is not only narrower than Title VII, but
also does not require a showing of intent and does not have a statute of
limitations.101 An Equal Pay Act claim requires a plaintiff to show that
she was doing equivalent work but receiving less than a male employee.102 The Court held that Ledbetter’s argument was unsound under
Title VII because it would “shift [the employer’s] intent from one act
[that which consummated the discriminatory employment practice] to a
later act that was not performed with bias or discriminatory motive.”103

93. Id. at 634–36. In Morgan, an African-American former employee brought a lawsuit
against a railroad for racial discrimination and retaliation under Title VII. The Supreme Court held
that Morgan could only recover for discrete acts of discrimination which occurred within 300 days
of the date that he filed his charge with the EEOC or appropriate state agency under Title VII. Morgan could also recover using a hostile work environment theory for acts occurring more than 300
days before the EEOC charge was filed, as long as the acts were part of the same hostile work environment and at least one occurred within the 300 day period. See Nat’l R.R. Corp. v. Morgan, 536
U.S. 101 (2002).
94. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 638 (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114, 117 (internal quotations
omitted)).
95. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 638 (2007).
96. Id. (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114).
97. Id. (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115–16).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 640 n.9.
101. Equal Pay Act of 1964, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006).
102. Id.
103. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 619 (2007).
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But the Court held that had Ledbetter pursued her Equal Pay Act claim,
“she would not face the Title VII obstacles that she now confronts.”104
In other words, Ledbetter’s failure to strictly follow arguably unclear statutory requirements warranted the Court to refuse her arguments
and the entire claim. By focusing more on the totality of the circumstances of her discriminatory treatment, Ledbetter lost what cognizable
individual claims she may have had for individual discriminatory acts
under an EEOC claim. Had Ledbetter pursued the Equal Pay Act claim
that was dismissed at the district court level, she potentially would have
been more successful in bringing the totality of her discriminatory treatment forward.
The dissenting opinion in Ledbetter took a different approach to
Justice Alito’s interpretations of both Bazemore and Morgan.105 Departing from traditional Court custom, Justice Ginsburg’s dissent was read
from the bench, “an act that, in her own words, reflects ‘more than ordinary disagreement.’”106 Ginsburg powerfully used personal pronouns in
her dissent to speak directly to every hypothetical “you,” namely women,
in the audience, including her colleagues and every other potential Title
VII claimant.107 Justice Ginsburg stated that “[i]ndeed initially you may
not know the men are receiving more for substantially similar
work . . . [and] you sue only when the pay disparity becomes steady and
large enough to enable [you] to mount a winnable case, you will be cut
off at the Court’s threshold for suing too late.”108 The fact that Ginsburg
read her dissent from the bench essentially raised a red flag over the
Ledbetter decision, making the headlines of the newspapers and inspiring
heated debates in both Congress and the presidential campaign.109
C. A Legislative Override: The Signing of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay
Act
The Supreme Court’s decision in Ledbetter quickly became a part
of campaign platforms in the subsequent presidential election and in dis-

104. Id. at 640.
105. Id. at 645–49 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
106. Guinier, supra note 42, at 540 (quoting Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The 20th Annual
Leo and Berry Eizenstat Memorial Lecture: The Role of Dissenting Opinions (Oct. 21, 2007),
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_10-21-07.html).
107. Guinier, supra note 42, at 540.
108. Id. at n.13; see also Lani Guinier, The Supreme Court, 2007 Term-Forward: Demosprudence Through Dissent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 4, 40–41 (2008).
109. Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Memo; Oral Dissents Give Ginsburg a New Voice,
N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/31/washington/31scotus.html; Robert
Barnes, Over Ginsburg’s Dissent, Court Limits Bias Suits, WASH. POST, May 30, 2007, http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/29/AR2007052900740.html.
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cussion of what was perceived as a conservative Court.110 The Court’s
5–4 decision was heavily criticized and denigrated by Ledbetter as “siding with big business.”111 Democrats immediately took up legislation to
“right the wrong” of the Court’s decision.112 This led to Ledbetter’s
compelling testimony in the House on the first version of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, the Fair Pay Restoration Act.113 Then-Senator Obama cosponsored the first version of the Act in January 2008.114 Ledbetter’s testimony echoed Justice Ginsburg’s dissent.115 But when the Fair
Pay Restoration Act bill was introduced, President George W. Bush
threatened a veto.116 The bill eventually passed the House but died in the
Senate, where Republicans, such as Senator John McCain, publically
denounced the bill as “anti-business.”117
Infuriated by Senator McCain’s refusal to vote for a legislative remedy, Ledbetter emerged as a major figure in the subsequent presidential
campaign.118 Having met then-Senator Obama, Ledbetter began campaigning on his behalf.119 In the 2008 election, then-democratic presidential candidate Obama and future First Lady Michelle Obama120 fre110. Tamara Lytle, Pay Equity: Are Women Still Being Run Over in the Workplace?, WASH.
LAWYER, Oct. 2009, at 27–28.
111. Guinier, supra note 42, at 540; see also Robert Barnes, Exhibit A in Painting Court as
Too Far Right, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2
007/09/04/AR2007090401900.html; Linda Greenhouse, supra note 22; Steven Greenhouse, supra
note 22; Editorial, Injustice 5, Justice 4, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/31/opinion/31thu1.html.
112. Jacqueline Palank, Democrats Will Try to Counter Ruling on Discrimination Suits, N.Y.
TIMES, July 13, 2007, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F02E3D71E3EF930A25754
C0A9619C8B63.
113. Testimony, supra note 24, at 10–13.
114. Mohammed, supra note 11, at 147.
115. Testimony, supra note 24, at 10. Ledbetter testified:
Justice Ginsburg hit the nail on the head when she said that the majority’s rule just
doesn’t make sense in the real world. You can’t expect people to go around asking their
coworkers how much they are making. Plus, even if you know some people are getting
paid a little more than you, which is no reason to suspect discrimination right away. Especially when you work at a place like I did, where you are the only woman in a male
dominated factory, you don’t want to make waves unnecessarily. You want to try to fit in
and get along.
Id. at 10.
116. Mohammed, supra note 11, at 148.
117. Guinier, supra note 42, at 542.
118. Id.
119. Pickert, supra note 23.
120. When interviewed, Michelle Obama had kind words for Lilly Ledbetter: “She’s [Ledbetter] long since lost her ability to gain any financial return from her Supreme Court loss, but she is out
on the road, fighting hard to make sure that our daughters and granddaughters get paid equally for
the work that they do. She’s a special lady, a working class lady, and a fighter.” Michelle Obama, Larry King Live, CNN, Oct. 8, 2008, transcript available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANS
CRIPTS/0810/08/lkl.01.html.
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quently referenced Ledbetter during campaign stops and in debates with
Republican opponent McCain.121 At the Democratic National Convention, Ledbetter was a featured speaker.122 As a presidential candidate,
Obama made a campaign promise to see the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act
through into law.123
The Act passed Congress on January 28, 2009, with a largely partyline vote.124 The next day, President Obama fulfilled his campaign
promise.125 With Ledbetter by his side, President Obama signed the Act
into law and proclaimed: “[M]aking our economy work means making
sure it works for everyone.”126
By making the claim-filing period start anew each time a claimant
receives an unequal paycheck, the Act specifically addresses the Supreme Court’s decision in Ledbetter, which, according to the Act, “significantly impairs statutory protections against discrimination in compensation that Congress established and that have been bedrock principles of American law for decades.”127 The language of the Act amends
Title VII in a narrow fashion, codifying the “paycheck accrual rule.”128
The Act also makes an important accommodation to employer interests,129 however, expressly limiting back-pay recovery to no more than
two years prior to the filing of the claim.130 This limitation prevents the

121. The Third McCain-Obama Presidential Debate (Oct. 15, 2008), http://www.debates.org/
pages/trans2008d.html.
122. Pickert, supra note 23.
123. Mohammed, supra note 11, at 147.
124. Id. at 148.
125. Ledbetter remained at the forefront of the newly elected president’s agenda after his victory. Traveling with Obama to Washington, D.C. on a celebratory train trip prior to the inauguration,
Ledbetter was in attendance at the various ceremonies and danced with the President at one of the
inauguration balls afterwards. Pickert, supra note 23.
126. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Signs Equal-Pay Legislation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/30/us/politics/30ledbetter-web.html.
127. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). Furthermore, Congress found: “The
Ledbetter decision undermines those statutory protections by unduly restricting the time period in
which victims of discrimination can challenge and recover for discriminatory compensation decisions or other practices, contrary to the intent of Congress.” Id. § 2 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5).
128. Id. § 3 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)).
129. Charles A. Sullivan, Raising the Dead?: The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, 84 TUL. L.
REV. 499, 524 (2010).
130. Section 3 of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act states:
In addition to any relief authorized by [42 U.S.C. § 1981(a), which provides for compensatory and punitive damages], liability may accrue and an aggrieved person may obtain
relief as provided in subsection (g)(1), including recovery of back pay for up to two years
preceding the filing of the charge, where the unlawful employment practices that have
occurred during the charge filing period are similar or related to unlawful employment
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Act from imposing potentially enormous liability on employers, while
allowing a plaintiff to receive compensation that will still reflect the effect of discrimination over the years.131 Overall, however, the vast majority of a plaintiff’s lost wages are unrecoverable since most claims are
based on discrimination spanning several decades.132 While the Act effectively eliminates the 180-day statute of limitations faced by Ledbetter,
it also limits the recovery of back pay to two years preceding the filing of
the charge.133
D. Implementing the Act in the Current Employment-Litigation Landscape
Now, after the enactment of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, a
plaintiff must meet several requirements for a discrimination claim to be
cognizable under Title VII. First, a plaintiff must present a claim that is
cognizable under the laws enforced by the EEOC.134 More specifically, a
claim must allege a basis covered by EEOC statutes.135 Second, a claim
must allege that a plaintiff was subjected to employment discrimination
based on membership in one or more of the EEOC’s protected categories.136 Third, the claim must pertain to an issue covered by the EEOC
statutes, such as the Equal Pay Act of 1963.137 Under Title VII, plaintiffs
may bring either a disparate-treatment or disparate-impact claim.138
A plaintiff filing a disparate-treatment claim almost always bears
the burden of persuasion in proving an employer’s discriminatory intent

practices with regard to discrimination in compensation that occurred outside the time for
filing a charge.
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 3, 123 Stat. 5, 5-6 (2009) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)(B)).
131. Sullivan, supra note 129, at 525–26.
132. Lytle, supra note 110, at 27.
133. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
134. EEOC,
EEOC
COMPLIANCE
MANUAL
§
2
(2009),
available
at
http://archive.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/threshold.html#2-I.
135. Id.
136. Covered bases include: Title VII: Race/color; national origin; religion; sex (including
pregnancy). EPA: Sex (compensation discrimination only). ADEA: Age (40 years or older). ADA:
Disability. All Statutes: Retaliation for protected activity; opposition to discrimination; participation
in the EEO process. Id.
137. Covered issues include: job decisions, employment practices, and other terms, conditions,
and privileges of employment; harassment based on a protected basis; reasonable accommodation;
referral practices; labor organization practices; practices undertaken by apprenticeships and other
training programs; advertising and recruitment; medical inquiries and examinations; maintenance
and confidentiality of medical records; limiting, segregating, and classifying; and retaliation and
actions likely to deter protected activity. Id.
138. Putnam, supra note 62, at 690.
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under Title VII.139 In addition, a plaintiff filing under Title VII must first
file a precursory charge with the EEOC before filing a lawsuit.140 If a
plaintiff is filing under the Equal Pay Act, however, he or she does not
have to file a charge with the EEOC first.141 This EEOC requirement
does not apply to Equal Pay Act claims because the language of the Act
does not require a plaintiff to file an EEOC charge before filing a private
law suit.142 Since most Equal Pay Act claims will also raise Title VII sex
discrimination issues, however, plaintiffs are encouraged to file a charge
with the EEOC to prevent their claim from being precluded by time limits.143
In 2008, before the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act went into effect, in
terms of litigation, the EEOC filed only 325 lawsuits.144 It is important
to understand the following statistics in order to consider the possible
implications of the Act. In 2008, 95,402 discrimination charges were
filed with the EEOC, an increase of nearly 13,000 from 2007.145 Sexbased claims totaled 29.7% of these charges—28,372—and only 954—
roughly 1%—arose from the Equal Pay Act.146 Claims arising from Title
VII alone totaled 30%—28,698.147 None of the lawsuits filed by the
EEOC included an Equal Pay Act claim, as Ledbetter’s suit did.148 This
indicates several things. First, out of all the EEOC discrimination claims
filed in a year, typically less than 1% actually move forward to the litigation stage. Second, this indicates that an even smaller percentage actually make it into the courtroom. Last, the fact that not a single Equal Pay
Act claim moved forward to litigation indicates just how rare it is for
pay-discrimination claims to make it to the courtroom in the first place.

139. Id. at 691. Under the Equal Pay Act, however, a plaintiff bringing a claim does not have
to prove discriminatory intent. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2006). Under the EPA, a “plaintiff must
prove that two workers of opposite sex (1) in the same establishment are (2) receiving unequal pay
(3) on the basis of sex (4) for work that is equal.” MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 574 (6th ed. 2003).
140. Time Limits for Filing a Charge, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/employees/timeliness.cfm
(last visited Aug. 26, 2010).
141. Id.
142. Equal Pay Act of 1964, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006).
143. Federal Laws Prohibiting Job Discrimination Questions and Answers, EEOC,
http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/qanda.html (last modified Nov. 21, 2009).
144. EEOC, LITIGATION STATISTICS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997 THROUGH FISCAL YEAR 2008
(2009), http://archive.eeoc.gov/stats/litigation.html.
145. EEOC, CHARGE STATISTICS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997 THROUGH FISCAL YEAR 2008
(2009), http://archive.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. Although, Ledbetter’s Equal Pay Act claim failed very early on in her case. Ledbetter
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 638 (2007).
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Generally, federal courts149 disfavor employment-discrimination
plaintiffs.150 As a whole, employment-discrimination claims end less
favorably for plaintiffs than any other type of claim.151 As a result, plaintiffs are filing fewer suits.152 Yet, the number of EEOC charges has remained constant, indicating, according to Stewart J. Schwab, that the
drop in lawsuits has not been caused by less discrimination.153
Between 1979 and 2006, plaintiffs won just 15% of employmentdiscrimination cases, compared with 51% of other types of suits.154
Some suggest this is due to hurdles that employment-discrimination
plaintiffs are forced to overcome.155 The statistics are even bleaker at the
appellate level. Defendants, often companies, win 41% of employmentdiscrimination cases on appeal that they lost at the lower level.156 Plaintiffs, on the other hand, win only 9% of employment-discrimination cases that they previously lost.157 This disparity is much wider than for nonemployment-discrimination cases.158
But plaintiffs should not be dissuaded from either filing a charge
with the EEOC or filing a private lawsuit based on the current statistics.
A strategy exists for the EEOC when filing a lawsuit. The EEOC has
become better at prioritizing plaintiffs’ claims that have the best chances
of winning at trial.159 Defendant companies tend to use this information
to settle more cases, leaving plaintiffs with a weaker employment-

149. While many states have supplemented the federal discrimination statutes, this Comment’s
focus will remain on federal courts because the Act is a federal statute. See Federal Laws Prohibiting Job Discrimination Questions and Answers, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/qanda.html (last
modified Nov. 21, 2009).
150. Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 104 (2009).
151. Id.
152. In 1998 the number of federal employment-discrimination cases filed was 23,722. By
2007, that number dropped to 15,007. Lytle, supra note 110, at 29.
153. Id.
154. Clermont & Schwab, supra note 150, at 111.
155. See Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson, Rights Realized? An Empirical Analysis of
Employment Discrimination Litigation as a Claiming System, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 663, 701–03
(2005); Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L.
REV. 555, 557–58 (2001). For example, David Benjamin Oppenheimer conducted a jury verdict
study of California state and federal employment-discrimination cases which revealed that minorities
and women fare particularly badly in wrongful discharge and discrimination jury trials, as compared
to other types of plaintiffs and other types of employment cases. David Benjamin Oppenheimer,
Verdicts Matter: An Empirical Study of California Employment Discrimination and Wrongful Discharge Jury Verdicts Reveals Low Success Rates for Women and Minorities, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
511, 513–18 (2003).
156. Clermont & Schwab, supra note 150, at 116.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Lytle, supra note 110, at 29.
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discrimination case to move to trial, where they ultimately will lose.160
In addition, the EEOC has increased its use of mediation, ending many
cases before they end up in court.161
Taking these statistics into account, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay
Act should not drastically change the litigation landscape for employment-discrimination cases, which is already complicated at best. Regardless of the amendments the Act brought to Title VII, it did not eliminate the elements required of a cognizable discrimination claim. Thus, a
proper narrowly tailored interpretation of the Act should not cause a
dramatic increase in litigation. By narrowly applying the Act to the different compensation schemes at issue, courts will ensure that the Act’s
possible implications are minimally felt by concerned employers.
III. THE LILLY LEDBETTER FAIR PAY ACT IN APPLICATION
The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act was specifically tailored to amend
Title VII for claims arising from discriminatory compensation schemes.
Using the facts in Ledbetter as a guide, the scope of the Act is limited to
a “discriminatory compensation decision or other practice.”162 In addition, the Act has a retroactive effect.163
This Part analyzes the Act in application. To fully illustrate how
the Act will function in terms of litigation, this Part will examine the different compensation schemes likely to come into question under the Act.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Section 2 of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act states:
Congress finds the following:
(1) The Supreme Court in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618
(2007), significantly impairs statutory protections against discrimination in compensation
that Congress established and that have been bedrock principles of American law for
decades. The Ledbetter decision undermines those statutory protections by unduly restricting the time period in which victims of discrimination can challenge and recover for
discriminatory compensation decisions or other practices, contrary to the intent of Congress.
(2) The limitation imposed by the Court on the filing of discriminatory compensation
claims ignores the reality of wage discrimination and is at odds with the robust application of the civil rights laws that Congress intended.
(3) With regard to any charge of discrimination under any law, nothing in this Act is intended to preclude or limit an aggrieved person’s right to introduce evidence of an unlawful employment practice that has occurred outside the time for filing a charge of discrimination.
(4) Nothing in this Act is intended to change current law treatment of when pension distributions are considered paid.
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 2, 123 Stat. 5, 5–6 (2009) (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5).
163. Id. Though enacted on January 29, 2009, the Act took effect as if enacted on May 28,
2007, a day before the Supreme Court’s decision in Ledbetter.
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In addition, examples are presented to illustrate the function, meaning,
and implications of the Act under a narrow judicial interpretation.
A. Different Compensation Schemes at Issue Under the Lilly Ledbetter
Fair Pay Act
Given the Ledbetter decision and the subsequent statutory enactments of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act amending Title VII, employers
seeking to limit their future liability must now carefully assess how their
compensation decisions may be interpreted. But what qualifies as a
compensation decision under the Act? Ledbetter presented perhaps the
most common scenario—the regular paycheck. The Act should be narrowly interpreted for this purpose, to dissuade plaintiffs from filing a
flood of unwarranted claims based on other compensation schemes. Yet,
there are a number of other claim possibilities in light of the circumstances in Ledbetter. Beyond regular paychecks received by an employee,
the impact of the Act must be considered in light of 401(k) accounts,
pension plans, and social security benefits because if the Act is not interpreted narrowly, each of these income sources could potentially fall under the protective umbrella of the Act.
In order to completely examine the potential effects of the Act in
the near future, this section will address the different compensation
schemes most likely to be challenged. To begin, the most common retirement fund plans are examined, starting with 401(k) accounts. Next,
another familiar retirement plan is discussed, the pension plan. A brief
discussion of social security benefits follows. Finally, the compensation
scheme most likely to be effected by the Act’s provisions, current paychecks, is introduced and analyzed.
1. 401(k) Accounts and the Narrow Implications of the Act
A 401(k) retirement account is considered an employee benefit
plan.164 A 401(k) is a retirement and savings plan that allows an employee to elect to have a portion of his or her pretax salary contributed to

164. Simply put, an “employee benefit plan” is defined as:
A written stock-purchase, savings, option, bonus, stock-appreciation, profit-sharing,
thrift, incentive, pension, or similar plan solely for employees, officers, and advisers of a
company. The term includes an employee-welfare benefit plan, an employee-pension
benefit plan, or a combination of those two. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3). But the term excludes any plan, fund, or program (other than an apprenticeship or training program) in
which no employees are plan participants. — Often shortened to plan. Cf. PENSION
PLAN.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 564 (8th ed. 2004).
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a defined-contribution plan.165 These retirement plans are heavily regulated by both Congress and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).166 This
section is divided into two subparts. The section first discusses 401(k)
accounts as defined-contribution plans and presents examples of typical
401(k) account cases. The section then analyzes 401(k) accounts in
terms of potential implications of a narrow interpretation of the Act.
a. Defined-Contribution Plans and Employment-Discrimination Litigation
A 401(k) defined-contribution plan allows employees to defer current income taxes on saved earnings and money until it is withdrawn.
Employees are able to elect to have a portion of their current wages
placed into a 401(k) account.167 Employee benefit plans are regulated
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).168 Under
ERISA, 401(k) accounts are a defined-contribution plan regulated by the
IRS. In addition, there are built-in nondiscrimination tests in 401(k) plan
administration to ensure that a plan does not favor highly paid employees.169
Employers may prefer 401(k) accounts for a number of reasons.
Instead of making guaranteed pension payments, employers need only
pay employees to maintain a 401(k) plan.170 This makes 401(k) accounts
a cost-effective benefit to employers. In addition, 401(k) accounts are
generally more secure because they contain protections such as insurance.171 Despite whatever ills may befall a business, employees are always guaranteed the funds placed into their 401(k) accounts. For the
most part, cases based on 401(k) plans are litigated in the form of class
165. A defined-contribution plan is covered under ERISA. Employees have a separate retirement account funded by both employee and employer contributions. The benefit that the employee
receives is based solely on what has accumulated in his or her individual account. Id.
166. EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., HISTORY OF 401(K) PLANS (2005),
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/facts/0205fact.a.pdf.
167. Id.
168. 26 U.S.C. § 414 (2009).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. 401(k) accounts are regulated by built-in insurance, which protects an individual’s investment into their account. Insurance is regulated by both Congress and the IRS to protect from tax
fraud and irresponsible fund management. In addition, a 401(k) is considered more secure than a
traditional pension plan because the money that an individual deposits is placed in a secure account.
An easy way to think of this account is depositing money into one’s savings account. Despite what
unpredictable events occur in the course of business, an individual savings account will always be
protected, and the employee is guaranteed to get it either at their election to withdraw early or in
retirement. While 401(k) plans can have complicated structures in terms of aggressive investment
schemes, for the purposes of this Comment the discussion will refer to the most simple 401(k) plans.
EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., supra note 166.
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action lawsuits because funds are generally managed as groups rather
than individually. As a compensation scheme, 401(k) accounts are investment plans that rely heavily on the administration of the plans themselves.172 Built-in nondiscrimination tests and other protections are constructed around the plan’s administration. These protections, in theory,
will prevent problems with plan administration.173 Generally, most
401(k) litigation arises out of the plan’s administration. An illustration
of a common type of 401(k) case clarifies these concepts.
Several common types of 401(k) plan lawsuits exist. One common
type of lawsuit arising from 401(k) plans is breach of fiduciary duty.174
Another common type of lawsuit—although not often resolved in favor
of plaintiffs175—is improper 401(k) plan fees.176
Most 401(k) plan lawsuits, including the aforementioned common
types of lawsuits, come in the form of class actions. Class actions may
arise when an employer or plan administrator invests a 401(k) in underperforming stocks, thereby diminishing investor returns and cutting an
employee’s potential retirement income.177 When a 401(k) plan administrator mismanages a fund, investors will typically come together in litigation since many are affected, it is less costly, and a class action will often
result in a faster resolution than many individual lawsuits.
In addition, since 401(k) accounts fall under ERISA,178 a number of
litigation preemptions may also come into play.179 Conflict preemption
under ERISA occurs when a state remedy is not permitted by federal law
or exceeds federal remedies.180 Essentially, under ERISA, conflict

172. By their very nature, investment plans are forward-looking, because contributions are
made early and hopefully grow over time.
173. Id.
174. See LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assoc., Inc., 552 U.S. 248 (2008); Debra Cassens
Weiss, Supreme Court Allows Lawsuit Alleging Mishandled 401(k), A.B.A. J., Feb. 20,
2008, http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/supreme_court_allows_lawsuit_alleging_mishandled
_401k/;
Carrie
Johnson,
Supreme
Court
Rules
Employees
Can
Sue
Over
401(k) Misconduct, WASH. POST., Feb. 21, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2008/02/20/AR2008022001157.html.
175. Most cases end in dismissal. See Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575 (7th Cir. 2009).
176. See id.
177. See supra note 174.
178. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (2002).
179. Id. § 1144 (2006).
180. See Metro Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987); Darcangelo v. Verizon
Commc’ns, Inc., 292 F.3d 181, 186–87 (4th Cir. 2002). It is important to note that the proceeding
example, LaRue, is an example of a case which overturned one type of conflict preemption under
ERISA. Prior to LaRue, the Court had held in Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell,
473 U.S. 134 (1985), that a participant in a disability plan “that paid a fixed level of benefits could
not bring suit under § 502(a)(2) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),
88 Stat. 891, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2), to recover consequential damages arising from delay in the
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preemption provides a court with a ground to dismiss a cause of action if
the claim falls under certain provisions.181
Between the challenges posed by class action claims and ERISA
preemptions, it is difficult for individual claims based on 401(k) accounts
to succeed. Individual claims based on 401(k) accounts are difficult to
handle, but are still possible because 401(k) accounts are administered in
large groupings, typically by companies independent of an individual’s
employer.182 What affects one person will certainly affect the rest of the
individuals who are being administered under the same plan.183
An illustration of a 401(k)-related case that reflects more similarities to an individual discrimination case can be found in LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Associates, Inc.184 Plaintiff James LaRue filed a lawsuit
against his former employer and its ERISA-regulated 401(k) retirement
plan in 2004.185 The plan allowed participants to direct the investment of
their contributions per specific plan rules. In 2001 and 2002, LaRue
asked his employer to make certain specific changes to the investments
in his individual account.186 LaRue’s employer, however, never followed
through, causing over $150,000 in losses to his retirement account.187
The Supreme Court recognized that the landscape of retirement investments has changed over the years and encouraged lower courts to interpret employee-benefits law to allow individuals to sue over administrative
problems with their accounts.188
As compensation schemes, 401(k) accounts are relatively complicated. In many respects, a 401(k) is not what one might consider a traditional compensation scheme because it does not generate a regular “paycheck” to an individual. It may be easier to think of a 401(k) account as
more of a savings account or trust fund that an employee can access at a

processing of her claim.” LaRue, 552 U.S. at 250. LaRue was different than Massachusetts Mutual
in that the plaintiff was specifically claiming as a participant in a contribution plan. Id.
181. John R. Richards & Howard S. Suskin, Understanding Complete and Conflict Preemption
Under ERISA: A Primer for Lawyers, 6 MEALEY’S LIT. REPORT 1 (Aug. 2007).
182. DEP’T OF LABOR, A LOOK AT 401(K) PLAN FEES, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/4
01k_employee.html.
183. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (2002); 29 U.S.C. 1144 (2006).
184. 552 U.S. 248 (2008).
185. Id. at 250–51.
186. Id. LaRue made the decision to make these changes when the stock market began to hit
turbulence following the burst of the Internet bubble and after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Johnson, supra note 174.
187. LaRue, 552 U.S. at 251.
188. Id. at 255–56. LaRue is an important example in the context of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair
Pay Act comparisons because discrimination cases are generally pursued at the individual level
because specific individual circumstances are at issue in comparison to traditional class action based
cases.
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certain age or at his or her own election.189 But the growth of the 401(k)
account depends on many factors that are completely out of the employer’s control. Investment and interest rates are not applied in a discriminatory fashion. An employer’s discriminatory practices, then, will have
little effect on what the employee receives in the end.
b. The Minimal Implications of a Narrow Interpretation of the Act on
401(k) Accounts
If the Act is narrowly construed, it is highly unlikely that such
compensation schemes will be affected by the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay
Act because of the unique characteristics of 401(k) accounts and their
management. Contributions to a 401(k) plan happen at the time of the
actual paycheck. When viewed in light of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay
Act, 401(k) contributions can be considered a compensation decision
because a percentage is taken out of an employee’s salary, and if that
salary is discriminatory, then the percentage might also be tainted by discrimination. Therefore, interpreting the language of the Act narrowly, to
fall under the Act, an unfair pay claim would have to be filed within the
180-to-300-day time frame a paycheck is received.190 Though there may
be reason to apply the Act to 401(k) accounts, doing so would broaden
the construction of the Act, creating a novel area of litigation if such a
claim could be pursued alone, which is expensive, tedious, and difficult
to prove.
Furthermore, the Act’s implications in terms of 401(k) plans can
create a number of complications for potential claimants. To make a
claim, the discriminatory compensation scheme should be fairly obvious
to the employee at the outset because once the paycheck claim is lost, so
would be an accompanying 401(k) claim. Essentially, the only way a

189. Many plans allow employees to make a hardship withdrawal before their retirement, but
an individual will end up paying a withdrawal penalty, on top of regular income taxes. After the
economy crashed in the Fall of 2009, many 401(k) accounts (in addition to pension plans) were
affected. Tara Siegel Bernard, 401(k)’s-What You Need to Know, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/17/your-money/401ks-and-similar-plans/primer401k.html?
ref=401ks-and-similar-plans; Steven Greenhouse, 65 and Up and Looking for Work, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 23, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/24/business/economy/24older.html?ref=401ks-andsimilar-plans; Phyllis Korkki, The Horror of Examining a 401(k) Balance, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/25/business/25count.html?ref=401ks-and-similarplans; Editorial, From Here to Retirement, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/200
9/01/26/opinion/26mon1.html?ref=401ks-and-similar-plans; Paul J. Lim, When Nest Eggs Change
Colors, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/05/your-money/05fund.html?
ref=401ks-and-similar-plans.
190. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
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claimant should be able to bring a 401(k) account claim under the Act is
if he or she also brings a claim based on a current paycheck.191
In addition, if a claimant filed a successful claim under the Act, the
back pay would only increase two years from the percentage of the
amount entered into the account today.192 Employers will likely benefit
from selecting 401(k) plans because they cannot be substantially affected
by any changes that the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act brings in its current
form.193 The benefits of a 401(k) plan are better understood when compared to the problems that will likely be encountered under pension
plans.
2. Pension Plans and the Act’s Minimal Implications Under a Narrow
Interpretation
Pension plans fundamentally differ from 401(k) accounts in a variety of ways. Unlike 401(k) accounts, pension plans are not guaranteed to
employees if an employer goes bankrupt.194 Therefore, employee
pension plans are less secure than 401(k) accounts, which are more heavily regulated and protected.195 While still an employee benefit, pensions
are considered defined-benefit plans as opposed to 401(k) accounts,
which are considered defined-contribution plans.196 First, this subpart
will explain the basic scheme of pension plans. Second, this subpart will
discuss why a narrow interpretation of the Act is a correct solution to
Ledbetter and why its implications will be minimally felt.
a. Defined-Benefit Plans
A defined-benefit plan is one established and maintained by an employer, whereas a 401(k) is typically maintained by the employee himself.197 Usually a defined-benefit plan systematically provides for the
191. See infra Part III.A.4.
192. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
193. Id.
194. 26 U.S.C. § 414 (2009).
195. Id.
196. A pension plan differs from a contribution plan because it is:
A plan established and maintained by an employer primarily to provide systematically for
the payment of definitely determinable benefits to employees over a period of years, usu.
for life, after retirement; any pension plan that is not a defined-contribution plan. Retirement benefits under a defined-benefit plan are generally based on a formula that included such factors as years of service and compensation. If the trust funding the plan
lacks sufficient assets to pay the promised benefits, ERISA requires the employer to cover the shortfall.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 564 (8th ed. 2004).
197. Id.
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compensation of definitively determinative payments to employees.198
Definitively determinative payments are in an amount that is certain to
be calculated by determining factors such as tenure, service, and earnings
history.199
Pension plan benefits are typically distributed over many years during retirement and include any plan that is not a defined-contribution
plan.200 Generally, defined retirement benefit plans are based on set factors such as earnings history, tenure of service, and age.201 Whereas
401(k) plans are based on investment returns, pensions, as defined plans,
are based on a set formula known well in advance.202
Pension plans leave more room for discrimination because of the
factors considered when generating the plan. For example, one determining factor in an individual’s pension plan is his or her earnings history with the company.203 Thus, if an individual, like Ledbetter herself, has
an earnings history tainted with discriminatory pay decisions, his or her
pension plan will be at least partially based on a history of discriminatory
pay decisions. A 401(k) account, on the other hand, will be built by taking a fixed percentage or amount out of every paycheck.204 While the
paychecks that may be applied to a 401(k) account may be based on discriminatory pay decisions, the discrimination virtually stops at the account. In a pension plan, discriminatory pay decisions continue with
each and every pension check issued by the company.205
In addition, pension plans are distributed in monthly increments to
employees. Under a 401(k), all contributions may be deposited into one
fund.206 A 401(k) plan does not have the employer doling out monthly
“paychecks” during retirement, but leaves the individual employee to
withdraw funds at his or her own election.207 Unlike the guise of a savings account that may protect a 401(k), pension checks give the impression that discrimination is ongoing, and the employer is very much responsible for it.208
Pension cases are generally more common than 401(k) account cases because claims arise from checks that an individual regularly receives.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. 26 U.S.C. § 414 (2009).
203. Id.
204. Bernard, supra note 189.
205. Id.
206. IRS, PENSION AND ANNUITY INCOME 3–4 (2009), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/p575.pdf.
207. Id.
208. Bernard, supra note 189.
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The fact that a pension plan continues to issue paychecks to a retired employee thus potentially opens an employer up to more liability under the
Act. It is possible that pensions could give rise to a claim under the Act
because an employee, like Ledbetter, who receives a regular pension
paycheck tainted with an employer’s discriminatory pay scheme, will
have an opportunity to file claims during retirement while those retired
employees with a 401(k) account will not.209 But it is important to note
the congressional findings under the Act. The congressional findings
state that “[n]othing in [the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act] is intended to
change current law treatment of when pension distributions are considered paid.”210 Thus, for pension plans under the Act “it may be determined that pension benefits are considered paid ‘upon entering retirement and not upon issuance of each annuity check.’”211
b. Minimal Pension Implications and a Narrow Interpretation of the Act
Essentially, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act does not amend the
pre-Ledbetter requirements for a pension scheme. Therefore, the same
rules the Ledbetter Court considered and based its ruling upon should
still stand under a narrow interpretation of the Act.212 The paycheck accrual rule is not intended to come into effect for regular pension checks
an individual may receive from the plain language of the Act.213 Under
the Act’s direct language, if employees want to bring an EEOC claim
based on their pension scheme, they must do so within 180 to 300 days
from the date they retire. Otherwise, an individual may find his or her
claim to be time-barred.214
Perhaps the best illustration of how a pension plan may be affected
by the Act can be distinguished from the Ledbetter case itself.215 Since
the Act is retroactive, the circumstances in the Ledbetter case fell pre-

209. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). See supra Part III.A.1. This is also evident from the fact that the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act directly refers to Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
210. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
211. EEOC, COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 2-IV (2009), http://archive.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/
threshold.html#2-IV-A (quoting Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat.
5 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.)) [hereinafter EEOC,
COMPLIANCE MANUAL].
212. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
213. Id.
214. EEOC, COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 211.
215. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
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cisely within the terms of the legislation.216 Unlike what Ledbetter argued in her Supreme Court case, the paycheck accrual rule, under an interpretation of the Act constricted to its terms, will not directly apply to
pension checks received by a plaintiff.217 Had the Act existed prior to
Ledbetter, using a similarly narrow, or perhaps what may be described as
a “cramped interpretation,”218 Ledbetter would have been required to file
an EEOC claim within 180 to 300 days from when she retired, not from
when she received her very first discriminatory paycheck from Goodyear. If Ledbetter did not do so, her claim would be properly timebarred as the majority decision in Ledbetter discussed.219 Despite all of
the discussion in Ledbetter about the paycheck accrual rule, the Act does
not extend the accrual rule to pension schemes.
Essentially, a narrow interpretation of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay
Act ought not to disrupt established precedents in terms of discrimination
in pension schemes.220 If the Act is not interpreted narrowly as it was
intended evidenced by the direct language of the Act, a great deal of
precedent could be unsettled by applying the paycheck accrual rule to
pension checks.221 This application would surely cause an increase in
litigation.
Largely unaffected by the Act’s amendments to Title VII, under a
narrow interpretation, concerned employers who do use pension schemes
should consider moving to a 401(k) plan. In general, pension plans are
falling out of favor because such plans are more expensive for employers
to maintain and do not provide the same level of protection for employees.222 Therefore, it would be mutually beneficial for both employees and employers to move to 401(k) accounts because employers
will face less potential liability and employees’ retirement will be better
protected.223
3. Social Security Benefits and the Act
Like both 401(k) plans and pensions schemes, social security benefits may also be considered in an EEOC pay-discrimination claim. Like
a 401(k) plan, social security benefits are based on a percentage of the
216. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
217. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 619–20.
218. Id. at 661 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
219. See generally id.
220. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
221. See id.
222. See supra Part III.A.1.
223. Id.
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amount an individual earned each pay period. Therefore, the percentage
being deducted and contributed into a social security fund can possibly
be tainted if an individual’s earnings are based on discriminatory pay
decisions.224
Social security benefits share similarities and differences with both
pension plans and 401(k) plans. Unlike a 401(k), where individuals control when to withdraw the money they contributed out of their paychecks,
social security disbursements come in the form of a check received incrementally similar to a pension plan. Like a 401(k) check, however, a
social security benefits check is based on a fixed percentage of what was
taken out of an employee’s paycheck at one point over an entire work
history. This calculation differs from a pension scheme that considers
many different factors in calculating the amount an employee receives.225
In addition, the amount of social security benefits received by an individual is typically much less than an average pension check or the average monthly amount contained within a 401(k) fund itself.226 Thus, for
most plaintiffs, a narrow interpretation of the Act would cause the cost
and risks posed by litigation to outweigh any potential recovery, ensuring
that the Act’s implications would be minimally felt.
There is very little information on pay-discrimination litigation
based solely on social security checks. Still, it may be possible for a
plaintiff who cannot make a claim based on a 401(k) plan to pursue a
claim based on a social security check. Based on the findings of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act on pension schemes, however, it is unlikely
that such a claim would be cognizable. If it were, a plaintiff would likely
have to file within 180 to 300 days of becoming eligible for his or her
social security benefits.227 In addition, social security benefit checks are
usually quite small in comparison to the paycheck itself. It is unlikely
that very many people would waste time and money on this type of litigation unless the discrimination was egregious and a class action was
undertaken.
4. The Implications of the Act on Current Paychecks
Although the effects of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act on 401(k)
accounts, pension schemes, and social security benefits will be minimal,
the Act will surely affect current employee payment schemes. The intent
224. Amalia Goldvaser, Note, Inflating Goodyear’s Bottom Line: Paying Women Less and
Getting Away With It, 15 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 99, 102 (2008).
225. See supra Part III.A.2.
226. Goldvaser, supra note 224.
227. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
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of the Act was to directly affect paychecks that an individual receives on
a regular basis.228 This subpart will explore how the Act has already
started affecting the handling of current paychecks based in discriminatory practices as illustrated through Mikula v. Allegheny County and will
conclude with a discussion of the various compensation schemes that
will be affected by a narrow interpretation of the Act.229
Mikula is the first case other than Ledbetter to illustrate the retroactive effect of the Act.230 Plaintiff Mary Lou Mikula brought a lawsuit
against her employer, Allegheny County, alleging that the county discriminated against her on the basis of her gender by failing to give her a pay
raise in violation of Title VII and for paying her less than a male employee performing equal work in violation of the Equal Pay Act.231 Despite lobbying for salary increases, Mikula never received a response
from the county.232 Eventually, Mikula filed a complaint with the county’s human resources department complaining about gender and age discrimination and asserting that a comparable male employee was paid
$7,000 more than her.233
In March 2006, Mikula filed her lawsuit, which, at the time, only
included an Equal Pay Act claim.234 In August 2006, Mikula received a
response from the county’s human resources department concluding that
her allegations of discrimination were unfounded.235 In April 2007, Mikula filed her precursory Title VII charge with the EEOC claiming that
the county committed a violation by paying her less than a male in her
same position would receive.236 Upon her receipt of a right to sue letter,
Mikula amended her original complaint to include the Title VII claim.237
At the time before passage of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act,
however, Title VII required plaintiffs to file charges with the EEOC
within 300 days of the unlawful employment practice.238 Since Mikula’s
EEOC charge was filed in April 2007, all claims based on acts before
June 2006 were time-barred.239 Before the summary judgment briefs
were filed in Mikula, the Court issued its decision in Ledbetter.240 Miku228. Id.
229. Mikula v. Allegheny County of Pa., 583 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2009).
230. Id. at 182.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 182–83.
233. Id. at 183.
234. Id. at 182.
235. Id. at 183.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.

2010]

Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act

265

la’s claims, like Ledbetter’s, were considered untimely under the traditional application of Title VII.241 Despite Mikula’s attempts to distinguish her case from Ledbetter, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the county.242
Mikula appealed the district court’s decision. While the appeal was
pending, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act became law.243 For the first
time in the proceedings, Mikula defined her claim as a “classic paycheck
accrual” case—precisely the type of claim the Act was designed to protect.244 Under the paycheck rule, Mikula’s paychecks reflected a “‘periodic implementation’ of a previously made intentionally discriminatory
employment decision or ‘other practice,’” and, therefore, her claim was
no longer untimely under the Act.245 Now operating under the Act, the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s decision that
Mikula’s claims were untimely as to her paychecks and remanded for
further proceedings.246
Mikula reflects the precise scenario that the Act was intended to apply to. The Act was constructed to operate primarily in the context of
current payment schemes. A narrow interpretation of the Act reflects its
purpose in this context. Based on the plain language contained within
the Act, the Act specifically serves as a solution to the grossly disproportionate pay scheme at Goodyear in the Ledbetter case.247 The facts in
Ledbetter seem to represent the most extreme in terms of pay discrimination, one which Ledbetter had tried to rectify with the EEOC on many
occasions.248 Thus, the Act was written with the narrow purpose of addressing the most extreme employment scenarios.
Ultimately, the compensation schemes affected by the Act appear
fairly predictable under a narrow interpretation. Due to the specific circumstances that apply to 401(k) accounts and social security benefits, it
is clear that if narrowly construed, the Act should only apply in the specific contexts of pension schemes and current paychecks. This application is not surprising considering the number of protections for such
schemes already existing in both Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. In
addition, Ledbetter’s pension and former paychecks were the essential
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 184.
244. Id. at 183.
245. Id. at 186 (quoting Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 3,
123 Stat. 5, 5–6 (2009) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (3)(A))).
246. Id. at 187.
247. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
248. Testimony, supra note 24, at 11–12.
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aspects of her case.249 Yet, the implications of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair
Pay Act will not come without criticism and concern.
IV. A NARROW ANSWER TO THE CONCERNS AND CONSEQUENCES
ARISING OUT OF THE LILLY LEDBETTER FAIR PAY ACT
Legislation and politics go hand-in-hand. In a manner of speaking,
it would be more concerning to the general public if legislation were not
followed by criticism and debate in Washington, D.C. This Part allays
the concerns arising out of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act by examining
the nature of the Act’s criticism and by arguing the necessity to keep the
Act narrowly tailored to its intended purpose. This Part will first address
specific criticisms voiced after the Act was signed into law. Next, the
Part will argue that the implications of the Act will be minimally felt so
long as the Act is narrowly construed.
A. The Resulting Critical Aftermath
Criticism of the Act arises mostly along political party lines. Businesses and conservative politicians generally prefer the Ledbetter decision to the Act because Ledbetter’s reasoning greatly limited the number
of claims that could pass the time bar.250 In many ways, it may have
been better for businesses if Ledbetter had actually won her case. Had
Ledbetter succeeded, the Act would not be exposing businesses to the
same extent of liability as it is now.251 Some critics suggest that a better
Ledbetter outcome would have been to narrowly tailor the decision to the
facts of the case, rather than invoking public outrage and the subsequent
legislative response.252 Now employers must find ways to limit the potential liability that may arise from employees’ claims against them.253
By and large, companies now consider the Act to be extremely
dangerous because this legislation could “open the door to lawsuits that
employers cannot defend.”254 After the Act was signed, some described
it as a “dangerous rush to judgment.”255 Conservative politicians also
want to protect businesses for many of the same reasons.256 It comes as

249. See generally id.; see also Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618
(2007).
250. Gerald Skoning, Overruled by Legislation, NAT’L LAW J., Oct. 5, 2009.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Steven Greenhouse, Experts Say Decision on Pay Reorders Legal Landscape, N.Y.
TIMES, May 30, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/30/us/30pay.html.
254. Barnes, supra note 111.
255. Id.
256. Id.
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no surprise that when the first version of the Act passed the House of
Representatives, President Bush threatened a veto of the legislation.257
Concerns about litigation overload are the primary criticism of the
Act. Conservatives who support unfettered capitalism and big businesses
criticize the Act as economic stimulus for trial attorneys.258 The theory
behind this concern is that amending Title VII to include the paycheck
accrual rule will provoke employees to bring claims. This criticism,
however, seems to ignore the fact that the Act is meant to be narrowly
tailored and therefore, narrowly interpreted.
B. Recommendation: A Narrowly Tailored Interpretation of the Act
The Act, in its own language, applies only to “compensation decisions or other practices.”259 This means that the Act will apply only to a
very limited number of plaintiffs who deserve the Act’s protections.260
In addition, the Act does not eliminate the requirements that must always
be met for a cognizable EEOC claim.261 Therefore, a narrow interpretation of the Act will not create a free pass for plaintiffs bringing dubious
or unfounded claims, despite the criticisms of some employers and politicians.
Applying the Act to anything but current payment schemes would
only create problems in the field of employment-discrimination litigation. The Act should be narrowly tailored to avoid problems of interpretation in the future, not exacerbate them. The need for a narrowly tailored interpretation explains why the language of the Act is focused on
compensation schemes.262 Thus, a careful, narrow interpretation of the
257. Id.
258. According to one critic:
For the tort bar, this is pure gold. It would create a new legal business in digging up ancient workplace grievances. This would also be made easier by the bill’s new definition
of discrimination. Companies could be sued not merely for outright discrimination but for
unintentional acts that result in pay disparities. Since these supposed wrongs could be
compounded over decades, the potential awards would be huge. Most companies would
feel compelled to settle such claims rather than endure the expense and difficulty of defending allegations about long-ago behavior. The recipe here is file a suit, get a payday.
And the losers would be current and future employees, whose raises would be smaller as
companies allocate more earnings to settle claims that might pop up years after litigating
employees had departed.
Editorial, Trial Lawyer Bonanza: Off and Suing with the 111th Congress, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 2009,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123146294351966567.html.
259. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
260. Putnam, supra note 62.
261. See supra Part III.A.1.
262. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
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Act by the courts is the most feasible solution to prevent a flood of litigation that could possibly result from a broad interpretation, which may
disregard the Act’s own language.
Furthermore, given the current economic climate, it is likely that
compensation schemes will markedly shift from pensions to 401(k) accounts. The case for pension schemes is further weakened by the fact
that people lost a great deal of money during the recent economic recession.263 In addition, pensions are not guaranteed to the same degree as
401(k) accounts because if an employer goes bankrupt, the employee
will likely lose his or her pension.264 Companies who bought out other
companies during the current economic climate will likely shift to 401(k)
accounts to better protect themselves from liability under the Act. In
addition, by shifting to 401(k) accounts, companies will be able to provide better compensation schemes for their employees.265 Not only will
employees be better protected, but employers will also save a great deal
of money.266 Thus, a shift to 401(k) plans would be mutually beneficial
for employees and employers.
In terms of future pay-discrimination claims filed with the EEOC,
the Act will not usher in radical changes to the field of employment discrimination if its interpretation is limited to current payment schemes.
With the two-year back-pay-limiting language and restrictive congressional findings on pension schemes, employers will not be liable for
much unless their practices are grossly disproportionate to what a plaintiff would be entitled to be rewarded.267 Thus, employer liability will
still be reasonably limited.
While the pay-discrimination portions of the Act will likely not
have the effect that critics worry about, there could be a potential problem with how courts interpret the Act’s vague “other practices” language.268 For the most part, the language in the Act appears to refer to

263. Mike Caggeso, Retirement Blues: Financial Crisis Pulls Billions from Pension Plans,
Crimping Consumers Dreams and Corporate Profits, MONEY MORNING, Feb. 16, 2009,
http://www.moneymorning.com/2009/02/16/pension-relief/.
264. Id. 401(k) plans differ from pension plans as well because an individual may be able to
tailor how he or she wants his or her money invested. Thus, very aggressive plans may rely more
heavily on stocks. These more aggressive plans were hit harder by the recession than a more conservative plan. See Bernard, supra note 189; Korkki, supra note 189; Editorial, supra note 189.
265. Stephen Mihm, The Guaranteed Retirement Account, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/14/magazine/14Ideas-Section2-C-t-001.html?fta=y.
266. Id.
267. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
268. Joanna L. Grossman & Deborah L. Brake, The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009: A
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Report,
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Three,
FIND
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Oct.
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2009,
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the specific concerns posed by Ledbetter itself.269 Yet, there is no mention of “other practices” anywhere in Ledbetter.270 At this point, no dominant trend has emerged in interpreting this language.271
However, this single phrase is the portion of the Act that could have
the largest impact on the employment-discrimination litigation landscape. This is because no one is entirely sure how courts will interpret
“other practices” in the future.272 If courts interpret the “other practices”
language broadly, the Act could extend beyond the intended scope of the
legislation and its findings.273 Such an interpretation may indeed open a
floodgate of litigation creating a novel area of the law under the Act.
Though, if courts interpret “other practices” conservatively, maintaining
the Act’s focus on compensation schemes, very little could change in
terms of the amount of employment-discrimination litigation which is
brought each year.274 At this point, only time will tell.
In keeping with the rule of narrow interpretation of the Act as discussed in this Comment, “other practices” should be clearly defined, ultimately either by Congress or in application by the courts. Because the
Act specifically refers to “compensation decisions,” I propose that the
definition of “other practices” be limited to existing compensation practices.275 Narrowly construing the term “other practices” will necessarily
limit courts and plaintiffs from overreaching in terms of existing statutes
of limitation in employment-discrimination claims. A reading of both
Ledbetter and the Act suggests that this definition of “other practices”
was intended, since both focus squarely on the issue of discriminatory
compensation practices.276
At this point it is uncertain if Congress clearly anticipated this risk.
Some suggest that Congress was too narrowly focused on the specific
facts of the Ledbetter case.277 If this is true, and the Act is interpreted
more broadly than anticipated, then Congress should have focused more
on the possible judicial ramifications of future legislation.278 Indeed, the
269. See Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.); see also Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
270. See Ledbetter, 550 U.S. 618.
271. Grossman & Brake, supra note 268.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. See generally id.
275. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
276. Id.; see also Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
277. Kathryn A. Eidmann, Comment, Ledbetter in Congress: The Limits of a Narrow Legislative Override, 117 YALE L.J. 971, 979 (2008).
278. Id.
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facts of Ledbetter, while similar to many other cases, will certainly be
very different to the individual experiences of other future plaintiffs.
One of the first indications of how the Court will interpret “other
practices” came during the current Supreme Court term. In February, the
Court heard Lewis v. City of Chicago, a firefighter entrance testing
case.279 At issue in Lewis was a question of disparate impact against racial minorities under Title VII.280 Though the facts are very different
from Ledbetter—and therefore not directly covered by the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act—Lewis raised issues similar to those raised in Ledbetter,
determining whether the Court’s or Congress’s Ledbetter reasoning controls Title VII claims that are not specifically covered by the Act.281 In
the end the Court held, “[I]t does not follow that no new violation occurred—and no new claims could arise—when the City implemented
that decision [adoption of a potentially discriminatory practice] down the
road. If petitioners could prove that the City ‘use[d]’ the ‘practice’ that
‘causes a disparate impact,’ they could prevail.”282 Essentially, the
Court’s holding in Lewis extended the Act to apply to decisions made in
the hiring process perhaps opening the door to broader interpretations of
the “other practices” language in the future.
It will likely take years to determine how the Act may continue to
be interpreted. If courts use the same narrowly tailored principles that
Congress used in creating the legislation, then the Act will not have a
widespread effect. Instead, it will help sympathetic plaintiffs, such as
Ledbetter, who deserve the protections of the Act. If interpreted more
broadly, however, the Act may realize some of the concerns of its critics.
The potential for this outcome lies in how courts will continue to interpret the “other practices” language in upcoming cases that exercise the
provisions of the Act. Until those decisions are made, it will be difficult
to criticize the legislation itself in practice.
V. CONCLUSION
Every American deserves to be fairly compensated for his or her
work regardless of race or gender. In this respect, the Lilly Ledbetter
Fair Pay Act is commendable for breaking down some of the remaining
barriers in the Civil Rights Act. The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act is precisely tailored because employers do not spontaneously discriminate
against their employees, and only those who are deliberately discriminating in pay will be subject to the Act if narrowly construed. Thus, with a
279. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 2191 (2010).
280. Id. at 2195.
281. Grossman & Brake, supra note 268.
282. Lewis, 130 S.Ct. at 2199.

2010]

Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act

271

narrow interpretation, employers should not run a high risk of future litigation as a result of the Act. The Act was a proper remedy for Ledbetter,
addressing a problem that should have been dealt with decades ago, since
it is not always possible to know when someone is being discriminated
against. The Act was meant as a direct solution to problems posed by
current paycheck compensation schemes and, if narrowly interpreted,
will avoid opening the door to incessant, frivolous litigation.
Furthermore, even if more employment-discrimination claims are
brought as a result of the Act, plaintiffs still have to meet a high burden
of proof. If employers are worried about any potential liability the Act
imposes, they should continue the trend of moving towards 401(k) compensation schemes instead of pension schemes. By narrowly interpreting
the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act to current paycheck schemes and restricting the Act’s “other practices” language to existing payment
schemes, fair pay for all Americans may finally be realized, and drastic
changes to the employment-litigation landscape will be avoided. Finally,
the fait accompli referred to by Justice Ginsburg in Ledbetter, will no
longer be beyond repair.283

283. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 644 (2007).

